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 Crazy Women and Hysterical Mothers: The 
Gendered Use of Mental-Health Labels in Custody 
Disputes 
 
Suzanne Zaccour* 
 
 
This research studies the use of gendered mental-health 
labels, such as “crazy,” “hysterical,” “insane,” and 
“emotionally unstable,” in Canadian custody cases 
decided between 2000 and 2016. Building on Judith 
Mosoff’s work on gender and mental health stigma in 
custody proceedings, it maps how these “pop-psychology” 
labels impact custody litigation. This investigation reveals 
that mental-health labels serve to discredit the mother, 
attack her parenting abilities, and distract from her 
allegations of violence by the father. The article also 
explores fathers’, mental health experts’, and judges’ roles 
in framing the mother’s credibility and parental capacity 
with regard to her alleged mental instability. It observes 
how the unjustified use of mental-health labels can backfire 
against the father, and how mothers can link out-of-court 
mental-health insults to legal arguments supporting their 
claim for custody. Although producing varied 
consequences, mental-health labels often reinforce gender 
biases and myths regarding domestic violence. 
                                                 
* B.C.L. & LL.B., McGill University (2016), LL.M., University of 
Toronto (2017), LL.M. candidate, University of Cambridge (2017-
2018). The author would like to thank Professor Brenda Cossman for 
her precious advice, support and supervision in the completion of this 
article, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and 
valuable comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The trope of the “crazy woman” is influential in our 
society, affecting psychiatry, the media, our culture, and 
popular discourses. A simple example, entering “crazy 
mom” into Google returns significantly more results than 
the search “crazy dad.” Our society’s historical obsession 
with labeling women as crazy has had important 
implications for women in numerous aspects of their lives.  
 
This article explores the intersection between 
gender and mental health stigma in the context of custody 
disputes. Building on Judith Mosoff’s work on how a 
mother’s mental illness negatively affects her claim for 
custody, it studies how discourses and stereotypes on 
mother’s mental health impact custody disputes in the 
context of an opposite sex, dyadic, nuclear family. The 
conflictual and gendered context of such litigation creates 
a fertile field for the mobilization of stereotypes about 
women’s mental health.  
 
This research analyses 120 cases involving the 
gendered use of a mental-health label, such as “crazy” or 
“hysterical,” rendered by Canadian courts between 2000 
and 2016. It finds that ableist labels are used especially by 
fathers, but also by judges and experts, to diminish 
mothers’ credibility and attack their parental capacity. 
Allegations of mental instability are rarely fully successful, 
but create space for the use of gendered stereotypes, 
distract the court from the analysis of the father’s violence, 
and are rarely punished. Finally, mothers also use mental-
health labels to testify that the father has called them 
“crazy,” yielding mitigating results in trying to attach legal 
consequences to this verbal abuse. Whether at trial or out 
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of court, it remains too acceptable to characterize mothers 
as mentally unstable.  
 
GENDER AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
 
The gendered nature of mental illness illuminates the study 
of mental-health labels in custody disputes. Far from being 
a mere coincidence, fathers’ and professionals’ tendency to 
pathologize mothers can be traced back to the beginnings 
of psychiatry, calling for scepticism regarding such 
allegations: in a patriarchal society, any woman can be 
“crazy.” 
 
Women outnumber men in diagnoses of mental 
illness since the eighteenth century,1 when hysteria was so 
frequently diagnosed that it was said to be “a woman’s 
natural state.”2 Anorexia, depression, borderline 
personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
premenstrual dysphoric disorder and anxiety disorders are 
in turn today’s “women’s diseases.”3 Phyllis Chesler 
uncovers the role of patriarchy in shaping the ideals of 
mental health: “What we consider ‘madness’, whether it 
appears in women or in men, is either the acting out of the 
devalued female role or the total or partial rejection of 
one’s sex-role stereotype.”4 Jane Ussher also exposes the 
                                                 
1  Jane M Ussher, The Madness of Women: Myth and Experience 
(London: Routledge, 2011) at 1 [Usher, “The Madness of Women”]. 
2  Ibid at 9.  
3  Ibid at 10–11. 
4  Phyllis Chesler, Women and Madness (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1972) at 56. 
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historical gender biases of psychiatry, namely the 
pathologization of femininity and the chastisement of 
women who deviate from expected gender roles. She 
argues that women—particularly working class, old, 
lesbian, and Black women—are routinely overdiagnosed 
by mental health professionals.5  
 
Feminist critics of psychiatry also link women’s 
psychological distress with sexism and violence against 
women. Discrimination and sexual violence are associated 
with depression,6 self-hate,7 substance abuse,8 post-
traumatic stress, and anxiety.9 Feminists argue that 
psychology “depoliticise[s] the roots of women’s 
distress”10 and that the concept of mental illness obscures 
oppression by suggesting “an internal pathology that can 
be incontrovertibly categorised and cured by 
biomedicine.”11 The pathologization of mothers to conceal 
domestic violence, that will be explored in this article, 
exemplifies this relationship between female madness and 
male violence.  
 
                                                 
5  Ussher, “The Madness of Women”, supra note 1 at 76. 
6  Ibid at 37.  
7  Mary B Ballou & Laura S Brown, Rethinking Mental Health and 
Disorder: Feminist Perspectives (New York, N.Y.: Guilford Press, 
2002) at xv.  
8  Lynn H. Collins, “Alcohol and Drug Addiction in Women: 
Phenomenology and Prevention” in Ballou & Brown, supra note 7.  
9  Ussher, “The Madness of Women”, supra note 1 at 38.  
10  Ibid at 35.  
11  Ibid at 4. 
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MENTAL ILLNESS AND CUSTODY 
 
Research on custody and mental illness situates the biases, 
factors, and roles that can be expected to affect cases 
involving gendered mental-health labels. Particularly, 
Judith Mosoff explores, in “Motherhood, Madness, and 
Law”, how mental-health labelling helps sever mentally 
disabled mothers’ relationship with their children.12 She 
investigates how the “psychiatric paradigm” justifies 
denying a mother any sense of privacy by defining her as a 
danger to her child.13 Mosoff takes issue with the uncritical 
reliance of judges on psychiatric expertise, viewed as 
“objective” and “scientific.” She also notes the 
dissemination of psychological ideas in popular culture, 
resulting in a reliance on “pop psychology” to evaluate a 
mother’s fitness as a parent.14 In “‘A Jury Dressed in 
Medical White and Judicial Black’”, Mosoff further 
presents custody proceedings as explicitly adversarial 
processes where “psychiatric evidence is usually the major 
aspect of the inquiry”15 and “becomes a ‘battle of the 
experts.’”16 Women face important biases as “an expert’s 
                                                 
12  Judith Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law” (1995) 45:2 UTLJ 
107 at 108 [Mosoff, “Motherhood”].  
13  Ibid at 110.  
14 Ibid at 111.  
15  Judith Mosoff, “‘A Jury Dressed in Medical White and Judicial Black’: 
Mothers with Mental Health Histories in Child Welfare and Custody” 
in Susan B Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/Private Divide: 
Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1997) 227 at 229. 
16  Ibid at 228. 
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mental health category or diagnosis becomes a ready vessel 
for a gendered interpretation of parenting.”17  
 
Anat S. Geva’s 2012 research in turn explores how 
judges report factoring mental health in custody 
determinations, stating that, although an important factor,18 
“parental mental illness is not an a priori reason to deny 
custody.”19 Geva identifies three main bases for deciding 
the impact of the mental illness on the case.  
 
First, judges may apply a favourable presumption 
to the mentally ill parent, either by assuming that the illness 
is at its worse during litigation,20 or by being skeptical of 
the parent who bases the custody claim on the other 
parent’s diagnosis.21 However, Diane T. Marsh rather finds 
that mentally ill people’s inability to parent “is often taken 
for granted, rather than properly assessed.”22  
 
Second, judges rely on mental health experts, 
despite their lack of awareness of “common reasoning and 
                                                 
17  Ibid. 
18  Anat S Geva, “Judicial Determination of Child Custody When a Parent 
is Mentally Ill: A Little Bit of Law, A Little Bit of Pop Psychology, 
and A Little Bit of Common Sense” (2012) 16:1 UC Davis J Int L & 
Pol’y 1 at 17–18. 
19  Ibid at 1.  
20  Ibid at 27.  
21  Ibid at 35. 
22  Diane T Marsh, “Parental Mental Illness: Issues in Custody 
Determinations” (2009) 23:1 Am J Fam L 28 at 29. 
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research errors committed by these professionals.”23 This 
reliance is strongly criticized by Mosoff who states that 
that “psychiatrists are poor assessors of risk”24 and ground 
their opinions in “a medical model of mental disorder,”25 
which “assumes that disability originates from impairment, 
a defect in the individual which may be fixed by an 
appropriate professional.”26 
 
Third, judges rely on their personal knowledge—or 
“common sense”27—regarding mental illness; however, 
they may overestimate “their understanding of the 
psychological factors relevant to post-divorce 
adjustment.”28 The considerable discretion that judges 
enjoy and the subtlety of mental health discrimination 
makes determining whether mental health is considered 
appropriately a difficult task.29  
 
Research on custody and mental illness focuses on 
parents with serious and diagnosed mental illnesses, 
leaving the coding of “normal” (undiagnosed) women as 
“crazy” unaddressed. This field of study provides a point 
of comparison for the exploration of the use of “pop-
psychology” labels (such as hysterical, crazy, nuts…). 
Building on Mosoff’s work on perceptions of mentally ill 
                                                 
23  Geva, supra note 18 at 8. 
24  Mosoff, “Motherhood”, supra note 12 at 134. 
25  Ibid at 132. 
26  Ibid at 132. 
27  Geva, supra note 18 at 1–2. 
28  Ibid at 2.  
29  Ibid at 18. 
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mothers in the judicial system, this research frames how 
gender, mental health stigma, and pop psychology intersect 
to affect mothers in custody disputes, even absent actual 
diagnoses and expert testimony. 
 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CUSTODY 
 
The prevalence of domestic violence cases requires a brief 
overview of how gender biases penalize victims of male 
violence in custody litigation. This background provides 
the tools to critically assess courts’ engagement with 
domestic violence concerns in the context of fathers’ 
pathologization of mothers, as well as their frequent choice 
of shared custody arrangements. 
 
Abundant feminist literature has detailed the 
disadvantages faced by mothers in custody disputes. 
Notably, Susan Boyd demonstrates that family law has 
been shaped by the lobbying of fathers’ rights activists and 
that a language of “equality” and “neutrality” masks biases 
favouring fathers.30 Judges further view women as less 
credible than men,31 and hold mothers to higher standards 
of proof and of good parenting.32 Mothers who allege 
                                                 
30  Susan B Boyd, Child custody, law, and women’s work (Don Mills, Ont: 
Oxford University Press Canada, 2003) [Boyd, “Child Custody”]; 
Susan B Boyd, “Demonizing mothers: Fathers’ rights discourses in 
child custody law reform processes” (2004) 6:1 Journal of the 
Motherhood Initiative for Research and Community Involvement 52. 
31  Megan Shipley, “Reviled Mothers: Custody Modification Cases 
Involving Domestic Violence” (2011) 86 Indiana LJ 1587 at 1596–
1597. 
32  Boyd, “Child Custody”, supra note 30; Joan S Meier, “Domestic 
Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial 
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domestic violence or violence against the child (which 
often co-occur)33 face additional biases. Despite its 
widespread nature, especially among litigating families, 
courts repeatedly fail to acknowledge fathers’ violence.34 
The difficulty of demonstrating family violence is 
exacerbated by stereotypes that mothers make false 
allegations of violence.35 Despite victims’ tendency to 
minimize and cover-up domestic violence, courts and 
assessors routinely assume that women who allege 
violence exaggerate.36 Their distrust is intensified by 
misconceptions about the purely physical nature of 
domestic violence, even though “‘[m]inor’ violence is a 
predictor of severe injuries in battered women, as is 
                                                 
Resistance and Imagining the Solutions” (2003) 11:2 Am UJ Gender 
Soc Pol’y & L 657 at 687. 
33  Lundy Bancroft, Jay G Silverman & Daniel Ritchie, The batterer as 
parent: Addressing the impact of domestic violence on family dynamics 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2011) at 9. 
34  Desmond Ellis, “Divorce and the Family Court: What Can be Done 
about Domestic Violence?” (2008) 46:3 Family Court Review 531 at 
531; Peter G Jaffe, Nancy KD Lemon & Samantha E Poisson, Child 
custody and domestic violence: A call for safety and accountability 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003) at 16; Meier, supra 
note 32. 
35  Adrienne Barnett, “‘Like Gold Dust These Days’: Domestic Violence 
Fact-Finding Hearings in Child Contact Cases” (2015) 23:1 Feminist 
Legal Studies 47 at 71; Christine Harrison, “Implacably hostile or 
appropriately protective? Women managing child contact in the 
context of domestic violence” (2008) 14:4 Violence Against Women 
381 at 395. 
36  Meier, supra note 32 at 684–685; Elizabeth M Schneider, Battered 
women and feminist lawmaking (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2008) at 104–108. 
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psychological abuse by the perpetrator.”37 Mothers who 
denounce violence are painted as “hostile” and 
“obstructive,” especially if they appear angry or 
emotional.38 This context illuminates the following 
discussion on the labelling of mothers who allege violence 
as “hysterical.” Also relevant is the fact that “batterers . . . 
commonly retaliate with accusations that their partners are 
actually the aggressors, are unfit, or are systematically 
brainwashing [or ‘alienating’] the children.”39 These 
allegations marginalize concerns regarding the father’s 
violence, inviting judges to default to the “neutral” position 
of assigning blame equally to both parties.40 This study will 
observe whether allegations of craziness and mental 
instability serve a similar function.  
 
Even when mothers succeed in demonstrating 
fathers’ violence, batterers are routinely granted contact, 
and even shared or full custody,41 because judges assume, 
wrongly, that violence against the mother does not harm 
the child or stops after the separation.42 Even evidence of 
                                                 
37  Elizabeth A Sheehy, Defending battered women on trial: Lessons from 
the transcripts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 278. 
38  Barnett, supra note 35 at 51, 53; Meier, supra note 32 at 691. 
39  Jaffe, Lemon & Poisson, supra note 34, ch 2. 
40  Shipley, supra note 31 at 1597; Meier, supra note 32 at 692–696. 
41  Linda C Neilson, “Spousal Abuse, Children and the Legal System: 
Final Report For Canadian Bar Association, Law for the Futures Fund 
March, 2001” (2001); Fiona Kelly, “Enforcing a Parent/Child 
Relationship at All Cost?: Supervised Access Orders in the Canadian 
Courts” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 277. 
42  Sheehy, supra note 37 at 221; Jaffe, Lemon & Poisson, supra note 34 
at 9; Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood 
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violence against the child may be disregarded because of 
the presumed importance of maintaining the father-child 
relationship at all cost.43 This treatment of family violence 
allegations allows batterers to use the legal system as a tool 
to continue to harass, intimidate, control, and terrorize 
mothers.44 Shared parenting orders also grant violent 
fathers increased opportunities to exert their violence and 
control, leading to consequences ranging from physical and 
emotional violence to abductions and even feminicides and 
infanticides.45  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This research is based on an analysis of discourses and 
trends in custody cases in which gendered labels are used 
in relation to the mother. First, a literature review of the 
area of gender and mental health allowed for the 
preliminary identification of words often used to describe 
women’s madness, such as “hysterical” and “crazy.”  
                                                 
in Maintaining the Traditional Family” (2009) 21 Can J Women & L 
315. 
43  Kelly, supra note 42.  
44  Ellis, supra note 34 at 531–532; Colleen Varcoe & Lori G. Irwin, “‘If 
I Killed You, I’d Get the Kids’: Women’s Survival and Protection 
Work with Child Custody and Access in the Context of Woman 
Abuse” (2004) 27(1) Qualitative Sociology 77 at 85. 
45  Helen Rhoades, “The Rise and Rise of Shared Parenting Laws: A 
Critical Reflection” (2002) 19 Can J Fam L 75; Boyd 2003, supra note 
30. 
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 Second, searches were conducted on Lexis Nexis 
and SOQUIJ with the following search words, for a total of 
1,130 cases:46 
 
 Hysteria, hysterical, hystérique, hystérie 
 Neurotic, neurosis, névrosée, névrose 
 Crazy, folle, fou, folie 
 Paranoid, paranoïaque (later excluded) 
 Insane 
 Delusional 
 Maniacal, maniac, maniaque 
 Basket case 
 Nuts 
 Deranged, dérangée 
 Malade mentale, sick […] head, malade 
dans la tête 
 Pathological, pathologique 
 Emotionally unstable 
 
Irrelevant cases were excluded from the results, for a total 
of 524 cases.  
 
Third, the remaining cases were sorted according to 
who was described by the label in order to verify that the 
search word was indeed a gendered label. 
                                                 
46  Lexis Nexis searches included the following filters: Court cases (All 
Canadian Court Cases); Legal Topics: Family Law  Common Law 
Jurisdictions [Family Law]  Custody and access; DATE(>=2000). 
Searches on SOQUIJ included the following filters: Plan de 
classification: famille  garde d’enfant; DATE(2000-2016). Negative 
search words were added to exclude recurrent irrelevant results. 
SOQUIJ searches include feminine and masculine forms of a word. 
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Fourth, for those labels that were confirmed as 
“feminine”47 (all except “paranoid”), cases in which the 
label targeted a child were excluded, and remaining cases 
where sorted according to the function of the label to allow 
for the preliminary identification of recurring themes.  
 
Fifth, for each label, the most relevant cases were 
selected to be more closely analysed, eliminating cases in 
which the label was used against the father or was 
irrelevant to the central issues of the case. At this step, 120 
cases were identified as most relevant.  
 
Sixth, thematic issues previously identified were 
refined based on the observation of patterns, problems, and 
unusual issues among those 120 relevant cases. Cases were 
classified into four (overlapping) categories. In each 
category, rates of success were calculated based on 
whether the mother obtained what she asked for in terms of 
custody or access. Because the outcome of any given case 
can depend on a number of factors, closer attention was 
paid to the judge’s reasoning.  
 
RESULTS 
 
The 120 selected cases reveal different functions of 
gendered mental-health labels. Part I discusses the use of 
these labels to discredit the mother (25 cases), especially 
when she alleges violence by the father. Part II addresses 
the use of mental-health labels in relation to the mother’s 
parental capacity (60 cases). Part III explores the 
consequences that can flow from a judge’s disapproval of 
                                                 
47  A “feminine” label was applied more often to mothers and daughters 
than to fathers and sons. 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 70 
the father’s allegation of mental illness (17 cases). Finally, 
part IV observes the effectiveness of mothers’ strategy to 
testify to the father’s out-of-court affirmations that she has 
mental health problems (40 cases).48 
 
Allegations of mental instability are often used by 
violent fathers. Although they have a low success rate 
when they are not confirmed by the judge’s observations at 
trial or expert testimony, these allegations shift the focus 
away from family violence concerns. Judges may succeed 
in identifying and criticizing opportunistic, illogical, and 
unsubstantiated allegations of mental instability. However, 
fathers are rarely penalized, making these inflammatory 
statements a safe way to try to undermine the mother’s 
case. When it is the mother who brings up the issue by 
testifying that the father called her “crazy,” she invites an 
analysis of the father’s abuse rather than her mental state. 
Mental-health insults are easily trivialized by the court; 
however, they contribute to the mother’s case when they 
are attached to broader concerns regarding the father’s 
violence, lack of parenting abilities, or alienation of the 
children.  
 
PART I: MENTAL-HEALTH LABELS AND 
MOTHERS’ CREDIBILITY 
 
Mental-health labels are used to discredit mothers in 25 
cases, including 16 victories for the father. These cases 
raise two main concerns. First, judges lack the formal 
training to impose improvised mental-health diagnoses on 
mothers. Second, the labelling of mothers as mentally ill 
                                                 
48  A single case may involve allegations falling under more than one 
category. 
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serves to discredit allegations of violence. Although fathers 
often fail to pathologize the mother who alleges violence, 
the combined roles of fathers, experts, and judges lead to a 
shift in focus from the father’s violence to the mother’s 
delusionality. 
 
Ableist labels rhetorically dramatize the mother’s 
lack of credibility. For example, rather than asserting that 
she is a liar, the father can say that she is a “pathological 
liar;”49 rather than finding that she exaggerates, the judge 
can find that she is “hysterical.” Moreover, the labelling of 
a bad litigant as a “hysterical mother” need not be based on 
an actual diagnosis; it can come from the judge’s 
assessment of the mother’s conduct. In J.D.P. v R.M.P., the 
roles of judge and psychiatrist are conflated, as the judge 
finds that the mother’s mental state, which “impacts every 
aspect of [the] case,”50 was apparent even before her 
medical records were produced:  
[The mother’s] mental state is a very serious 
concern. It does not take any formal training 
to perceive this. Her history of delusional 
thinking and her disordered recounting of 
events during the trial raise serious concerns 
as to her credibility. . . . Most significantly, 
and like many persons with obsessive 
thought patterns or delusional thinking, R. 
                                                 
49  ADB v DE, 2007 NSSC 182, 2007 CarswellNS 289 (WL Can) [ADB]. 
50  JDP v RMP, 2010 BCSC 1873 at para 98, [2010] BCJ No 2624 (QL). 
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seems to have lost the ability to doubt 
herself.51 
In Droit de la famille — 101255, the judge finds it 
clear that the mother should remain the custodial parent,52 
but still takes the time to criticize her “obvious hysteria”53 
based on her aggressiveness during her testimony.54 The 
judge contrasts the parents’ mental stability: “[le père] est 
apparu à la Cour comme nettement plus calme et pondéré, 
pour ne pas dire plus équilibré, que la [mère].”55 This 
analysis impacts the mother’s request for support, as the 
judge finds that the hysterical and resentful mother does 
not make sufficient efforts to find gainful employment 
because she wants to “make the father pay.”56  
 
Both quotes illustrate Mosoff’s remarks regarding 
the rise of pop-psychology discourse, as well as Geva’s 
observations regarding judges’ reliance on their own 
psychiatric knowledge. Judges are experts in credibility 
findings, but are not qualified to diagnose litigants who 
they may only have observed during one of the most 
                                                 
51  Ibid. 
52 Droit de la famille — 101255, 2010 QCCS 2387 at para 65, 2010 
CarswellQue 5576 (WL Can). 
53  Ibid at para 20.  
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid at para 5. Translation: “[the father] appeared to the Court to be 
considerably calmer and more balanced, if not more stable, than the 
[mother].”  
56  Ibid at para 20. See also AA v SNA, 2007 BCCA 375 at para 65, [2007] 
BCJ No 1656 (QL). 
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stressful periods of their lives. The rhetorical 
pathologization of mothers is also circular: the mother’s 
mental illness makes her not credible, and her lack of 
credibility evidences her mental illness.57 The discourse of 
the hysterical litigant echoes feminist literature both in 
psychiatry, regarding the disproportionate pathologization 
of women, and in law, regarding the biased evaluation of 
women’s credibility. “Common sense” psychiatric 
evaluations of mothers are all the more problematic as they 
serve to discredit allegations of violence.  
 
MOTHERS’ CREDIBILITY AND FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 
 
Mental-health labels used to discredit the mother are 
strongly correlated with allegations that the father is violent 
(23/25 cases). Fathers employ this strategy to shift the 
focus from their violence to the mother’s instability, with 
limited success (four victories in 12 cases). However, when 
it is the expert (six cases) or the judge (five cases) who 
raises the issue of mental health, mothers discredited as 
mentally ill are found “delusional” in their belief that the 
father has been violent and lose the case. 
  
i. Allegations by the Father 
 
In 12 cases, the father brings the mother’s mental health 
into question as a direct response to an allegation of 
                                                 
57  See Swaren v Swaren, 2007 ABQB 193 at para 21, [2007] 8 W.W.R. 
151. 
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abuse.58 The father’s rhetoric can obscure the actual cause 
of the mother’s lack of believability, as calling a mother 
“delusional” leaves unclear whether she is lying or 
mistaken. Davie v. Davie illustrates this possible 
confusion: the father “asserts that [the mother] is 
‘delusional’ and/or exaggerating to discredit him.”59 In 
Johal v. Johal, the mother asserts that the father is “a 
drinker, irresponsible and prone to abuse,”60 to which the 
father responds that “she either believes these things, and 
is therefore delusional, or, alternatively, has simply boldly, 
barefacedly lied to this Court.”61 The judge finds the 
father’s pathologization of the mother to be unwarranted.62 
The mother is not mentally unstable, but rather an 
“immature young women [who] allowed herself to indulge 
in some rather regrettable descriptions of events that are 
quite transparent exaggerations.”63 
 
When uncorroborated, fathers’ allegations that the 
mother is crazy for denouncing violence have limited 
success (4 victories/12 cases). Nonetheless, this rhetoric 
                                                 
58  See for example Ganie v Ganie, 2014 ONSC 7500, [2014] OJ No 6332 
(QL); Herar v Herar, 2012 BCSC 1257 at para 18, [2012] BCJ No 
1770 (QL); EBS v LJS, 2006 BCSC 968 at para 17, [2006] BCJ No 
1551 (QL); CLB v JAB, 2016 SKCA 101 at para 5, [2016] SJ No 430 
(QL); ADB, supra note 49 at para 6. 
59  Davie v Davie, 2015 ONCJ 662 at para 22, [2015] OJ No 6215 (QL).  
60  Johal v Johal, 2009 BCSC 139 at para 84, [2009] BCJ No 195 (QL) 
[Johal]. 
61  Ibid at para 83.  
62  Ibid at para 85. 
63  Ibid at para 87. 
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remains worrisome. Fathers can change the narrative and 
move the focus away from their violence to the mother’s 
mental state. The issue becomes which, of the father’s 
violence or the mother’s insanity, can be better 
corroborated. Faced with diametrically opposed assertions 
that the father is violent or that the mother is insane, two 
judges renounce making a finding on either issue,64 
echoing feminists researchers’ observations that violent 
fathers’ inflammatory accusations may lead judges to take 
a “neutral” stance towards litigants.65 The pathologization 
of mothers who are “too concerned” about the father’s 
violence can also interact with allegations of parental 
alienation. In Droit de la famille — 12943, the mother 
testifies that she feared for her life, to which the father 
replies that she is “deranged”66 and needs professional 
care.67 Both the judge and expert find the father abusive 
and unrepentant. Nonetheless, the pathologization of the 
mother allows the expert to recommend shared custody to 
prevent further parental alienation,68 and leads the judge to 
force the children to spend time with their father.69 This 
case is suggestive of the tension faced by mothers who 
must simultaneously protect their child from a violent 
father and support the father-child relationship.70 
                                                 
64  EBS v LJS, supra note 58; CLB v JAB, supra note 58 at para 12.  
65  Meier, supra note 32 at 692. 
66  Droit de la famille — 12943, 2012 QCCS 1747 at para 37, [2012] JQ 
No 3760 (QL). 
67  Ibid at para 56.  
68  Ibid at para 63. 
69  Ibid at paras 43, 97, 98.  
70  Varcoe & Irwin, supra note 44 at 92. 
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ii. Expert Testimony 
 
Judges are more receptive to allegations of mental 
instability coming from experts, who may refute testimony 
on the father’s violence by labelling the mother 
“delusional.” In the six cases where an expert pathologizes 
the mother, the father wins. The relevance of expert 
testimony is exemplified in C.E.L. v. D.C.A., where the 
expert raises the question of “whether or not [the mother] 
has fabricated an allegation [of sexual assault of the child] 
or whether she is delusional in her belief that the sexual 
abuse occurred, because the evidence she presents does not 
point to this conclusion.”71 To further ascertain whether the 
mother has fabricated the abuse, the judge orders the 
disclosure of documentation pertaining to her complaints 
of sexual violence as a child. This example resonates with 
Mosoff’s observation that mentally ill mothers are stripped 
of their privacy. The mother’s mental health and personal 
history are seen as the way to determine whether the father 
sexually assaulted the child, in lieu of a focus on evidence 
regarding the father or the child. 
 
Experts label mothers as delusional when they 
persist in their belief that violence has occurred, despite 
findings to the contrary. In R.R.W.E.S.-V. v. S.E.D.V., the 
expert recommends therapy for the mother to address “her 
excessive anxiety and poor stress coping skills [that] have 
led to her delusional thinking with regard to the alleged 
sexual abuse.”72 According to the expert, the mother’s 
                                                 
71  CEL v DCA, 2016 BCPC 147 at para 12, [2016] BCJ No. 1077 (QL). 
72  RRWES-V v SEDV, 2008 BCSC 1136 at para 125, [2008] BCJ No 1593 
(QL) [RRWES-V]. 
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“delusional beliefs” indicate that she will not refrain from 
talking negatively about the father.73 This testimony is 
puzzling: would a sane mother talk respectfully about the 
father she believes assaulted their child, or are persistent 
mistaken beliefs in sexual assault always pathological? 
Considering the law’s failure to identify cases of family 
violence, the latter deduction is problematic. 
 
Pointing to a precise disorder with causes and 
symptoms is secondary to the vague pathologization of the 
mother’s beliefs. In T.L.L.L. v. J.J.L., the expert “raised the 
possibility that the mother may have a delusional belief 
system or some other mental health issue”74 making her 
unable to accept that the children were not sexually 
assaulted. This expert opinion leads to limited supervised 
access for the mother. Here the expert is not using his 
psychiatric expertise to diagnose the mother in order to 
draw conclusions as to her credibility. Rather, unfounded 
allegations of violence are perceived as symptoms pointing 
to some vague and unspecified mental-health problem. 
Similarly, in A.F. v. D.G., the expert “would [seriously 
consider] a ‘DSM diagnosis of Shared Delusional 
Disorder.’”75 The judge “acknowledges that some of the 
opinions surrounding [the mother’s] mental health status is 
[sic] based on limited information as there was no formal 
clinical or psychological testing conducted.”76 
                                                 
73  Ibid at para 120. 
74  TLLL v JJL, 2013 MBCA 27 at para 25, [2013] MJ No 103 (QL).  
75  AF v DG, 2012 ONSC 764 at para 174, [2012] OJ No 483 (QL). 
76  Ibid at para 219. 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 78 
Nonetheless, the “specific psychological finding”77 is 
unimportant, and the mother not only loses custody but is 
also prevented from having any contact with the children 
(as is her family), until she engages in therapy and accepts 
that the father did not harm the child.78  
 
Of particular concern is Droit de la famille — 
112774, where the expert’s pathologization operates even 
if the mother’s allegations of violence are not “delusional.” 
The expert finds that the mother has hysterical personality 
traits,79 and that she has a tendency to dramatize the 
violence she was subjected to.80 This opinion factors into 
the judge’s decision to increase the father’s access. This 
depiction of the mother as overdramatic disregards the 
propensity of women to understate the amount and severity 
of violence to which they have been subjected,81 and it 
blames the victim for “overreacting” to “minor” violence. 
 
iii. Judges’ Observations 
 
In five cases, it is the judge who labels the mother as 
irrational, ensuring the father’s victory. Contrary to Geva’s 
finding that judges take the stressful nature of custody 
litigation into account, there is no mention in any of the 
                                                 
77  Ibid. 
78  Ibid at para 243. 
79  Droit de la famille — 112774, 2011 QCCS 4727 at para 48, [2011] JQ 
No 12040 (QL). 
80  Ibid at para 91. See also SLT v AKT, 2007 ABQB 701 at para 21, 48 
RFL (6th) 141. 
81  Meier, supra note 32 at 684.  
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cases studied that a mother’s behaviour at trial may not 
reflect her usual mental state.  
 
The mother’s false allegations of violence can be 
used to conclude that she is irrational, or the mother’s 
irrationality can be used to conclude that her allegations are 
false. In M.P. v. G.O., the Court finds that “[t]he complaints 
[of child abuse] were driven by hysteria and verged on 
malicious.”82 By contrast, in Droit de la famille — 091654, 
the Court comments that the mother appears sincere, but 
rejects as unfounded her fear of the father: “elle s’est 
montrée très subjective, elle a développé des réactions 
excessives qui ne s’appuient aucunement sur la réalité.”83 
The Court observes that “[le père] est calme et en contrôle 
de lui-même, contrairement à la [mère] qui s’enflamme et 
s’excite au point d’en devenir hystérique.”84 The reliance 
on the woman’s “hysteria” and “subjectivity” gives rise to 
a discourse that is both gender-coded and infantilizing.  
 
Although these cases may truly involve false 
allegations of violence, the reliance on stereotypes 
regarding “hysterical” victims of domestic violence puts 
                                                 
82  MP v GO, 2012 ABPC 180 paras 29, 31, ACWS (3d) 382. See also KH 
v JT, 2006 ABPC 364 at para 336, [2006] AJ No 1648 (QL); Bergeron 
v Gillstrom, 2009 BCSC 1616 at para 55, [2009] BCJ No 2378 (QL). 
83  Droit de la famille — 091654, 2009 QCCS 3115 at para 43. 
Translation: “she has shown herself to be very subjective, she has 
developed excessive reactions that are not based at all on reality.”  
84  Ibid at para 30. Translation: “The [father] is calm and in control of 
himself, unlike the [mother] who becomes agitated and gets worked up 
to the point of becoming hysterical.” 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 80 
mothers and children at risk.85 Judges’ typical “perception 
of abused mothers as overdramatic or hysterical”86 clouds 
their appreciation of violence allegations in custody 
disputes. In Droit de la famille — 113953, the judge finds 
that the mother is “quasi-hysterical” and lacks nuance in 
her portrayal of the father—even though the expert finds 
that neither parent has psychological problems.87 The judge 
orders shared custody despite the conflictual situation. 
Astonishingly, the judge uses the fact that the father is in a 
long-term relationship with another woman to further 
discredit the mother’s allegations of domestic violence.88 
The pathologization of mothers’ mental state is not the only 
stereotype at play, and fathers’ attempts at this 
pathologization are not always successful. Nonetheless, the 
insistence on mothers’ “hysteria” creates room for 
stereotypes to distract the court from an unbiased analysis 
of the evidence of family violence and contributes to the 
documented use of sexist assumptions in custody disputes. 
These assumptions hold women to higher standards of 
credibility, and, when used to improperly discard 
allegations of violence, can have dramatic and even deadly 
consequences.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85  Meier, supra note 32 at 672. 
86  Shipley, supra note 31 at 1595. 
87  Droit de la famille — 113953, 2011 QCCS 6716 at para 13, [2011] JQ 
No 18659 (QL). 
88  Ibid at para 8. 
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PART II: MENTAL-HEALTH LABELS AND 
MOTHERS’ PARENTAL CAPACITY 
 
In 60 cases, the labelling of the mother as mentally unstable 
suggests flaws in her parenting abilities. Mothers win 43 of 
these cases, with a variable rate of success depending on 
who raises the issue of their instability. When the labelling 
is done by experts or judges, the father is likely to win 
(10/12 cases). By contrast, fathers’ labelling is less 
successful (7/48 cases), but can still distract the court from 
more serious issues and needlessly increase the complexity 
of the case. Experts may testify to support or contradict the 
father’s pathologization of the mother. Absent medical 
evidence, judges use legal arguments and credibility 
findings to filter opportunistic and unmeritorious 
allegations targeting the mother.  
 
i. Allegations by the Father 
 
Although judges89 and experts90 may also bring up the 
issue, it is most frequently fathers who first invoke 
mothers’ mental health to question their parenting abilities 
(48/60 cases). Fathers may attempt to dramatize trivial 
parenting flaws. For example, in K.M.P. v. B.J.P., the 
                                                 
89  See Swaren v Swaren, supra note 57; JWM v JLM, 2007 BCSC 1405, 
42 RFL (6th) 254; CB v BB, 2010 ABPC 355, [2010] AJ No 1278 (QL); 
JDP v RMP, supra note 50; JN v DV, 2006 ABPC 181, [2006] AJ No 
912; SLT v AKT, supra note 80. 
90  See Rawn v Laviolette, [2007] OJ No 2336, 158 ACWS (3d) 252 
[Rawn]; JDP v RMP, supra note 50; Droit de la famille — 121408, 
2012 QCCS 2694, [2012] JQ No 5768 (QL); CCP v SMN, 2002 BCPC 
17, [2002] BCJ No 164 (QL) [CCP]; RRWES-V, supra note 72; Droit 
de la famille — 112774, supra note 79. 
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father accuses the mother of being emotionally unstable 
and “characterizes her as being impatient and easily 
frustrated.”91 In Johal v. Johal, the father attempts to 
pathologize the mother’s practices regarding hygiene, but 
the judge rejects his labelling as “neurotic,” finding the 
father’s assertions “to be embellished by exaggeration.”92 
The pathologization of the mother’s care work can also 
reinforce gendered stereotypes about mothers’ rigid 
parenting. In Kriegel v. Kriegel, the father describes the 
mother as emotionally unstable, aggressive, violent, 
histrionic, rigid, and regimented.93 Rather than accepting 
the father’s assertion that the mother is not a good parent, 
the Court finds that the parents are incapable of sharing 
custody because of their animosity and different 
childrearing styles, and grants custody to the mother.  
 
Despite their limited overall success (7/48 cases), 
fathers’ allegations of mental instability remain 
problematic. These serious allegations warrant as much 
attention as other pressing concerns, such as the father’s 
violence.94 Inflammatory allegations, repeated court 
appearances and dragging out the litigation process are 
common abusive tactics of batterers and multiply 
disruptions to the child’s life, as exemplified in Butty v. 
Butty: 
                                                 
91  KMP v BJP, 2009 BCSC 1373 at para 20, [2009] BCJ No. 1988 (QL).  
92  Johal, supra note 60 at para 50. 
93  Kriegel v Kriegel, 2002 BCSC 752 at para 10, [2002] BCJ No 1094 
(QL). 
94  See Kovacs v Kovacs, 59 OR (3d) 671 at para 192, [2002] OJ No 3074 
(QL); Allen v Wu, 2011 ONSC 4539 at para 22, [2011] OJ No 3670 
(QL). 
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Even if the Respondent had previously been 
primary caregiver for the children, sudden 
allegations of mental instability and suicidal 
behaviour raised sufficient concerns about 
her to “undo” the status quo. . . . As a result, 
a temporary equal time arrangement was 
created. “Without prejudice” from the 
litigants’ perspective. But with plenty of 
prejudice for two children whose daily lives 
and home environment were dramatically 
impacted.95 
 
ii. The Role of Experts 
 
Experts rarely testify directly on fathers’ allegations that 
the mother is mentally ill. When they do (9 cases), they 
may contradict the father’s assertions and qualify the 
mother as “normal enough.” In T.M.F. v. M.H., the judge 
accepts the expert’s testimony that “[has] not found [the 
mother] to be sufficiently emotionally unstable that one 
would say that this should begin to preclude her ability to 
be an effective parent to the children.”96 Similarly, in Droit 
de la famille — 0614, the father asserts that the mother is 
schizophrenic or bipolar, despite findings to the contrary 
by his own expert.97 The father’s conviction that the mother 
is crazy makes shared custody impossible. The mother is 
thus granted full custody. In two other cases, the expert 
                                                 
95  Butty v Butty, 2008 CanLII 23946 (ON SC) at paras 386–387, 168, 
[2008] OJ No 2017 (QL) [Butty 2008]. 
96  TMF v MH, 2001 BCSC 161 at paras 60–61, [2001] BCJ No. 175 (QL).  
97  Droit de la famille — 0614, 2006 QCCS 5558 at paras 27, 80, [2006] 
JQ No 13918 (QL). 
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rejects the father’s assertion that the mother has a mental 
illness,98 but the mother loses nonetheless. By contrast, 
when the expert testifies that the mother is delusional, the 
father invariably wins.99  
 
iii. The Role of Judges 
 
In the absence of medical evidence, judges filter 
unmeritorious allegations of mental instability with legal 
arguments and credibility findings. Focusing on the child’s 
best interest allows them to maintain the status quo in the 
absence of specific reasons to change the custody 
arrangement. In Yassin v. Loubani, the father alleges that 
the mother is emotionally unstable,100 but the judge 
comments that “[t]he children are currently in the 
[mother’s] care and control, and there is no suggestion that 
the [father] feels they are at risk in her care or that she cares 
for them poorly.”101 The mother retains custody.  
 
The lack of real concern for the children’s safety is 
an indicator that the claim of mental instability is 
unmeritorious. In Gauci v. Malone, the mother is alleged 
                                                 
98  Izyuk v Bilousov, 2011 ONSC 6451 at para 211, [2011] OJ No 4963 
(QL); RCR v SML, 2016 BCSC 1230 at para 83, [2016] BCJ No 1398 
(QL) [RCR]. 
99  Rawn, supra note 90; Droit de la famille — 121408, supra note 90; 
CCP, supra note 90; RRWES-V, supra note 72. 
100  Yassin v Loubani, 2006 BCSC 1887 at para 53, [2006] BCJ No 3261 
(QL). 
101  Ibid at para 54. 
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to be “emotionally unstable and an unreliable parent.”102 
The fact that the father wants the mother to have generous 
access to the children shows that he does not truly believe 
that she is a danger to the children.103 The judge maintains 
the status quo of the children residing primarily with the 
mother.104  
 
The inconsistency in the father’s positions is 
similarly held against him in Kalsi v. Kalsi, where the 
father is concerned “that his wife is emotionally unstable 
and incapable of looking after the children”105 but still 
“insists that [she] is capable of full-time employment.”106 
The judge also notes that it is “very significant” that the 
father “is content with joint parenting.”107 The Court 
concludes that the father’s allegations are opportunistic: 
“until [the father] found out that his wife had been cheating 
on him for many years, he apparently had no concerns at 
all with regard to his wife being a full-time mother at home 
with the children while he. . . was working long hours.”108 
The judge rejects the father’s application for the production 
of the mother’s medical records.109 These cases suggest an 
                                                 
102  Gauci v Malone, [2009] OJ No 2627 (QL) at para 2, 2009 CarswellOnt 
3633 (WL Can). 
103  Ibid at para 42. 
104  Ibid at para 66. See also Currie v Maudsley, 2011 ONSC 4214 at para 
13, [2011] OJ No 3294 (QL). 
105  Kalsi v Kalsi, 2009 BCSC 513 at para 55, [2009] BCJ No 759 (QL). 
106  Ibid. 
107  Ibid at para 58. 
108  Ibid at para 56. 
109  Ibid at paras 58–59. See also Butty 2008, supra note 95 at para 372. 
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effective way for judges to reject opportunistic allegations 
regarding mothers’ mental health without the need for an 
expert testify to their “normality.”  
 
PART III: WHEN MENTAL-HEALTH LABELS 
BACKFIRE 
 
As we have seen, most allegations of mental instability 
targeting mothers are unsubstantiated. Although judges 
often reject fathers’ assertions, they express explicit 
disapproval in only 17 cases. The mother wins in 14 of 
these 17 cases, although judges decline to attach 
consequences to the father’s problematic allegation in five 
cases. In the other cases, they may decide against shared 
custody, reduce the father’s access or grant the mother the 
indemnification of her costs.  
 
A. INCONSEQUENTIAL DISAPPROVAL 
 
In five cases,110 the father’s inappropriate allegation of 
mental illness is irrelevant: either the father wins, or the 
mother wins for other reasons. In R.C.R. v. S.M.L., the 
father’s lawyer’s comment that the mother “needs a 
litigation guardian as she is insane”111 is unfounded and 
“entirely inappropriate.”112 Nonetheless, the mother’s 
application to set aside previous orders is rejected for lack 
                                                 
110  Sakve v Sakve, 2000 BCSC 822, [2000] BCJ No 1072 (QL) [Sakve]; 
DML v DBL, 2016 BCSC 925, [2016] BCJ No 1066 (QL); ADB, supra 
note 49; Potter v Da Silva, 2014 ONCJ 302, [2014] OJ No 2970 (QL); 
RCR, supra note 98. 
111  RCR, supra note 98 at para 83. 
112  Ibid at para 84. 
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of change in circumstances or new evidence, and because 
the children’s best interests “are furthered by leaving those 
orders in place.”113  
 
In Sakve v. Sakve, the judge is very critical of both 
parties’ litigious behaviour.114 The father is however more 
to blame, as he “has attacked her on moral and ethical 
grounds,” calling her mentally unstable, a pathological liar, 
and an abusive mother.115 The judge finds that the mother 
“may well be right” in saying that the father, should he 
receive the increased access that is demanded, will use it 
“to cause trouble for the [mother] by seeking out evidence 
to use against her.”116 Nonetheless, the Court finds that the 
child’s best interest “lies in as much contact as possible 
with both his parents”117 and increases the father’s access 
to the child. This case exemplifies courts’ failure to prevent 
fathers from using the court process to frustrate mothers’ 
parenting. 
 
B. DISAPPROVAL WITH CONCRETE 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
In 12 cases, the judge’s disapproval has concrete 
consequences on the reasoning or outcome of the case. 
Although custody disputes are not punitive in nature, 
judges sanction fathers with adverse cost orders in two 
                                                 
113  Ibid at para 69. See also ADB, supra note 49 at para 13. 
114  Sakve, supra note 110 at para 5. 
115  Ibid at para 28. 
116  Ibid at para 30. 
117  Ibid at para 31. 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 88 
exceptional cases. In Miglin v. Miglin, the judge considers 
the unreasonableness of the father’s behaviour, listing “his 
unfounded allegations that the [mother] was emotionally 
unstable, and a threat to the children.”118 The judge does 
not grant the mother the complete indemnification of her 
costs ($110,702.85), because “[t]here are always two sides 
to every family conflict,”119 but still orders the father to pay 
$79,500. In Butty v. Butty, the father “had deliberately and 
knowingly fabricated serious allegations [of mental health 
problems] against the [mother] for the sole purpose of 
gaining strategic advantage in the custody dispute,”120 
which also allows for a substantial recovery of the mother’s 
costs.121 
 
Fathers also risk being penalized for asserting that 
the mother is crazy if it suggests that shared decision-
making122 or shared custody123 is impossible. A father’s 
belief and insistence that the mother is inadequate also 
affects his ability to promote the child’s relationship with 
the mother,124 and may even give rise to concerns regarding 
                                                 
118  Miglin v Miglin, [2000] OJ No 1042 at para 8. 
119  Ibid at para 9. 
120  Butty v Butty, 70 RFL (6th) 181 at para 42, [2009] OJ No 1887 (QL).  
121  Ibid at para 71. 
122  Antemia v Divito, 2010 ONSC 578 at para 86, [2010] OJ No 871 (QL) 
[Antemia]. 
123  Droit de la famille — 0614, supra note 97 at para 130; Testa v Basi, 
[2005] OJ No 3054 at paras 62, 72; Butty 2008, supra note 95 at para 
428. 
124  Chen v Liu, [2010] NBJ No 142. 
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the alienation of the child, justifying limiting the father’s 
access125 or granting custody to the mother.126 
 
In short, although fathers’ allegations that the 
mother is mentally ill are often unfounded, judges rarely 
express explicit reprobation. Despite a few exceptions, 
fathers still enjoy a large degree of liberty to position 
themselves as competent to characterise the mother as 
hysterical, delusional, or pathological with little fear of 
consequences. The tolerance for these inflammatory 
allegations is unlikely to deter this disruptive and sexist 
practice.  
 
PART IV: FATHERS’ OUT-OF-COURT MENTAL-
HEALTH INSULTS 
 
In 40 cases, the mother testifies that the father has used a 
mental-health label, generally “crazy,” to insult her, 
shifting the analysis from her mental state to his 
reprehensible conduct. This strategy has varying degrees of 
success: mothers experience 18 wins, 15 losses, and 7 
mitigated results. Irrespective of the final outcome, the 
importance of the name calling can be diminished with 
symmetry-based analyses (ten cases), by finding that the 
mother exaggerates its gravity (nine cases), by addressing 
it with a warning (six cases) or for other reasons (four 
cases). On the other hand, judges attach concrete 
consequences to the name calling when it is part of a 
demonstration that shared custody is impossible (ten 
cases), that the father lacks parental capacity (five cases), 
                                                 
125  CS v MS, 37 RFL (6th) 373, [2007] OJ No 787 [CS]. 
126  FDR v MDP, 2004 ABQB 956, [2004] AJ No 1502 [FDR]; EV c AVa 
(2004), SOQUIJ AZ-50257134 (QCCS) [EV]. 
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that he is alienating (six cases) or that the children have 
reasons to reject him (two cases).  
 
A. INCONSEQUENTIAL DISAPPROVAL 
 
Although judges do not condone name calling, they often 
find reasons not to attach concrete consequences to this 
behaviour. In 25 cases, either the name-calling has no 
impact on the judge’s reasoning (17 cases), or its 
importance is rhetorically diminished.  
 
i. Symmetry-Based Rhetoric  
 
In ten cases, the father’s behaviour is viewed negatively, 
but the judge also blames the mother and uses a symmetry-
based rhetoric. The gender-blind analysis of the parties’ 
behaviour allows for an illusion of symmetry between 
insults. Sexism and ableism are never raised, even when 
the father additionally called the mother a “slut” or used 
other gendered insults. Shared custody is chosen in five of 
these cases. 
 
In Droit de la famille — 091942, the father 
described the mother as crazy, sick, and lazy. The judge 
states that the father needs to respect the mother, but 
immediately switches to parents needing to respect each 
other:  
Ce que Madame veut et désire c’est du 
respect de la part de Monsieur. […] Monsieur 
doit le comprendre tout comme Madame doit 
cesser de faire des esclandres pour des 
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raisons futiles . . . . Il faut que chaque parent 
cesse de discréditer l’autre.127 
 
In T.E.H. v G.J.R., “[t]he father testified that the 
mother was emotionally unstable, jealous, controlling and 
very volatile,”128 and the mother “described the father as 
extremely abusive, controlling, and jealous.”129 According 
to the mother, the father frequently called her “crazy” and 
a “whore.”130 The judge’s factual findings are built on a 
rhetoric of symmetry of blame, making the father’s name 
calling rather inconsequential: 
3. This was and continues to be a toxic 
relationship in which both parties display 
immature and unhealthy behaviour. . . .  
4. Both parties are responsible for the conflict 
in their relationship. . . . 
6. Both parties appear to have mental health 
issues and lack insight into how their 
behaviour and conduct harms the children.131 
 
                                                 
127  Droit de la famille — 091942, 2009 QCCS 3536 at para 48. 
Translation: “What the mother wants and desires is respect from the 
father. The father must understand this just like the mother must stop 
making scandals for futile reasons. . . . Both parents must stop 
discrediting the other” [emphasis added].  
128  TEH v GJR, 2016 ONCJ 156 at para 62, [2016] OJ No 1552 (QL). 
129  Ibid at para 61. 
130  Ibid at para 61. 
131  Ibid at para 436 [emphasis added]. 
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In ordering joint custody, the judge comments that it is “the 
least detrimental alternative” for the children. 132 
 
Symmetry also serves a gender-neutral distribution 
of blame in J.A. v D.A., where the father also called the 
mother “crazy” and a “whore.”133 On the issue of domestic 
violence, the judge states: 
I am satisfied, that there were numerous 
incidents of pushing, shoving and name-
calling. . . . It stands to reason that the 
[father], being the larger and heavier of the 
two, inflicted more damage, but I conclude 
that both parties were active participants on 
these occasions. I find that I am unable to 
ascribe more blame to one or the other.134 
The Court rules in favor of shared custody. The 
symmetrical description of the parties’ “conflict” illustrates 
a gender-blind evaluation of domestic violence, reducing 
gender dynamics to differences in size. 
  
In these examples, the symmetry-based rhetoric 
absolves fathers of the emotional violence that may be at 
                                                 
132  Ibid at para 479. See also Droit de la famille — 082191, 2008 QCCS 
4094 at paras 16, 44; Droit de la famille — 131375, 2013 QCCS 2710 
at paras 15, 27, 30; King v Landry, 2016 MBQB 164 at para 45, [2016] 
WDFL 5421; Antemia, supra note 122; Droit de la famille — 06462, 
2006 QCCS 6801. 
133  JA v DA, [2002] OJ No 2315 at para 46, 114 ACWS (3d) 773. 
134  Ibid at para 136 [emphasis added]. See also Usova v Harrison, 2009 
BCSC 1640 at para 45, [2010] BCWLD 2386. 
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play when they use sexist mental-health insults. In 
situations of domestic violence, insistence on mutual blame 
may comfort judges that they are acting as “neutral” 
arbiters, while leaving unaddressed some fundamental 
differences between the parties’ behaviours.135 The choice 
of shared custody in half of these cases may appear 
egalitarian, but it is unlikely to diminish conflict. Rather, 
shared custody provides increased opportunities for name 
calling, abuse, and violence.  
 
ii. Insignificance of insults 
 
In nine cases, the judge rejects the mother’s 
characterization of the father’s behaviour as serious. 
Shared custody is ordered five times, and custody to the 
father, once. In Droit de la famille — 093238, the judge 
suggests that the mother makes a mountain out of a 
molehill: “De fait, dans son témoignage, la mère s’en est 
pris au défendeur sur de petites choses qu’elle a montées 
pour les rendre importantes alors qu’elles ne l’ont jamais 
vraiment été.”136 In T.E.H. v G.J.R., the Court finds that 
“[a]lthough there is evidence that the father was 
manipulative and controlling of the mother, the mother 
greatly exaggerated her evidence.”137  
 
                                                 
135  See Meier, supra note 32 at 692–96; Shipley, supra note 31 at 1597–
98. 
136  Droit de la famille — 093238, 2009 QCCS 6110 at para 161 [emphasis 
added]. See also Droit de la famille — 131455, 2013 QCCS 2816; 
Droit de la famille — 15707, 2015 QCCS 1423; Droit de la famille — 
141063, 2014 QCCS 2016. 
137  TEH v GJR, supra note 128 at para 411. 
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This minimization of the father’s behaviour can 
happen even in cases where the father threatened to kill the 
mother and/or the child.138 In Johal v Johal, the mother 
testified that the father called her “crazy” and threatened to 
kill her and the child. The Court, concluding that there was 
likely a threat, writes: “I expect what was said was in part 
the product of the frustration of all the circumstances. [The 
incident cannot] be taken as reliable evidence that he 
actually intended to do harm to either the defendant or the 
child.”139 The Court concludes by granting shared custody 
until kindergarten, followed by custody to the father who 
is seen as more likely to facilitate the mother’s access. 
Considering the real risks of feminicide and infanticides 
faced by mothers who separate from violent partners, 
punishing the mother for not sufficiently fostering child’s 
relationship with a father who makes death threats appears 
both unfair and dangerous. Moreover, these cases reinforce 
the erroneous cliché that victims overstate domestic 
violence. 
 
iii. Warnings and Second Chances 
 
Judges also use warnings to the father with the hope that 
his problematic behaviour, including calling the mother 
“crazy,” will stop (six cases). In Droit de la famille — 
13835, the father’s behaviour, which caused the mother to 
lose her job and be hospitalized for a psychiatric evaluation 
that revealed no mental illness, is described 
euphemistically:  
                                                 
138  Droit de la famille — 131375, supra note 132; Johal, supra note 60.  
139  Johal, supra note 60 at para 59. 
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[Le père] n’a pas eu un comportement 
exemplaire après la séparation, alors qu’il 
disait aux enfants que leur mère était une 
« folle » et une « salope », et qu’il a tout fait 
pour éloigner celle-ci [de ses enfants] en [la] 
faisant passer pour une personne atteinte de 
maladie mentale.140 
The Court believes that the father’s inappropriate 
behaviour will end naturally.141 Stating that custody 
decisions are not punitive, the Court is content with a 
warning: if the father continues acting immaturely, the 
child’s interest may no longer lie in a shared custody 
arrangement.142 
  
This case reveals judges’ common assumption that 
harm to the mother does not harm children. Clearly, 
children are affected by their mother’s forced 
hospitalization and loss of employment, as well as by being 
repeatedly told that she is crazy. Nonetheless, the warning 
justifies the judge’s failure to sanction or even prevent 
controlling and sabotaging behaviour by the father, as the 
shared custody arrangement that is maintained will 
continue to present opportunities for abuse. 
 
                                                 
140  Droit de la famille — 13835, 2013 QCCS 1618 at para 70. Translation: 
“[The father] did not behave in an exemplary manner after the 
separation, when he told the children that their mother was a ‘crazy 
person’ and a ‘slut,’ and did everything he could to keep her away from 
the children by making her look like a mentally-ill person” [emphasis 
added]. 
141  Ibid at para 70. 
142  Ibid at paras 66–68. 
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In R.E.G. v. T.W.J.G., the Court grants custody and 
a restraining order to the mother, but rejects the supervision 
of the father’s biweekly access and grants him half of the 
summer. The Court finds that the father must be more than 
a “weekend dad.” However: 
Tom needs to understand that any aggression, 
any intimidation or any breach of the Court 
order will not be tolerated. . . . Tom’s 
parenting time with the children shall be 
conditional upon the following: 
(i)      That he refrains from any violent 
conduct in the children’s presence and any 
aggressive conduct with respect to either [the 
mother or her boyfriend].143 
 Cases in which the father is granted another chance 
despite his previous problematic, and even violent, 
behaviours raise two concerns. First, judges are addressing 
high-conflict litigating families with statements and orders 
that encourage them to return to court, rather than with 
more appropriate clear, strict, and long-lasting orders.144 
Frequent litigation is particularly onerous for the custodial 
parent, the domestic violence victim, or the parent with less 
                                                 
143  REG v TWJG, [2011] SJ No 434 at para 132, 376 Sask R 1. See also 
King v Landry, supra note 132 at para 46; Whidden v Ellwood, [2015] 
OJ No 3815, 2015 CanLII 41263 (ONSC) [Whidden]; Droit de la 
famille — 131838, 2013 QCCS 3410. 
144  Janet R Johnston, “A Child-Centered Approach to High-Conflict and 
Domestic-Violence Families: Differential Assessment and 
Interventions” (2006) 12:1 Journal of Family Studies 15. 
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resources—generally the mother.145 Second, such rulings 
imply that the mother must continue to be victimized until 
the father exhausts all of his chances. Domestic violence is 
not a one-time error in judgment but rather an ongoing 
pattern that often continues and even escalates post-
separation. Such violence is unlikely to disappear with a 
court warning—especially when the father knows that 
perpetual litigation is more difficult (emotionally, 
financially, logistically) for the mother than for him.   
 
iv. Other Reasons not to Attach Consequences to the 
Name Calling 
 
Finally, judges decline to attach meaningful consequence 
to the father’s name calling in four other cases, leading to 
shared custody (ordered in three cases and agreed upon in 
one).146 In Droit de la famille — 12998, the judge refuses 
to make a finding regarding cruelty as a ground for divorce. 
The mother says that the father threatened, intimidated and 
insulted her (including by calling her “crazy”) and 
controlled all financial decisions.147 The Court finds that 
                                                 
145  Varcoe & Irwin, supra note 44; Wanda Wiegers, “Gender, Biology, 
and Third Party Custody Disputes” (2009) 47 Alta L Rev 1. 
146  NH v BH, 2016 SKQB 153, [2016] SJ No 257; PYYM v DM, 2003 
BCSC 766, [2003] BCJ No 1149 (QL) [PYYM]; Droit de la famille — 
082903, 2008 QCCS 5420; Droit de la famille — 12998, 2012 QCCS 
1934. 
147  Droit de la famille — 12998, supra note 146 at para 6. 
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attributing blame will not solve communication 
problems148 and grants the divorce on a no-fault basis.149 
 
In P.Y.Y.M. v. D.M., the father had called the 
mother “crazy,” a “mental case,” and “sick,” and said he 
wanted the mother dead in the presence of a child.150 The 
Court orders shared custody despite the parties’ inability to 
communicate to repair the children’s relationship with the 
father: “unless the parties exercise joint custody, [the 
children] will see their mother as the winner and their 
father as the loser.”151 Maintaining and promoting the 
father-child relationship is prioritized over the mother’s 
safety.  
 
In sum, judges routinely diminish the importance of 
the father’s denigration of the mother, failing to address 
issues of sexism, ableism, and emotional violence. Judges 
rely on problematic assumptions that women exaggerate, 
that children are not affected by domestic violence, that 
violence within a couple is reciprocal, and that it ends with 
the parents’ separation. These observations confirm and 
reinforce other researchers’ explorations of biases in 
custody disputes, situating these preoccupations in the 
context of ableist name calling by the father. 
 
 
                                                 
148  Ibid at paras 18–19. 
149  Ibid at para 20. 
150  PYYM, supra note 146 at para 55. 
151  Ibid at para 59. 
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B. DISAPPROVAL WITH CONCRETE 
CONSEQUENCES  
 
Judges attach consequences to the mother’s testimony that 
the father called them “crazy,” or rather to the broader 
argument to which it pertains, in 23 cases. These cases 
demonstrate a better understanding of the negative 
consequences of fathers’ verbal abuse on mothers and 
children, but are still often focused on other behaviours 
such as physical violence and parental alienation.  
 
i. Impossibility of shared custody 
 
In ten cases, the name calling is part of a demonstration that 
shared custody is impossible because of communication 
problems or domestic violence. A conclusion to that effect 
can lead to the mother having full custody even if the court 
finds the father to be an otherwise good parent.152 
“Communication problems” may also rise to the level of 
verbal violence. In D.N.D. v. W.S.C., the father’s 
“aggressive and entirely inappropriate communication and 
other behaviour”153 makes shared custody impossible, as 
the father’s domineering approach is not in the child’s best 
interests.154 In D.L.C. v. R.J.M., the fact that the father 
bullies the mother in the presence of the child (“calling her 
                                                 
152  Droit de la famille — 103750, 2010 QCCS 6828. See also JDL v RJJL, 
2012 NBBR 378, [2012] NBJ No 453 (QL); Antemia, supra note 122; 
Easson v Blase, 2015 ONSC 5170, [2015] OJ No 4803; Droit de la 
famille — 131838, supra note 143. 
153  DND v WSC, 2013 BCSC 336 at para 33, [2013] BCJ No 352 (QL). 
154  Ibid. See also GB c AF (2005), SOQUIJ AZ-50317822 (QCCS) at para 
33 [GB]; REG v TWJG, 2011 SKQB 269, [2011] SJ No 434 (QL). 
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names such as pathetic, f ...... crazy, a f ...... bitch, a pig, a 
witch and a crazy nut bar”)155 makes shared custody 
impossible.156 The Court recognizes both the child’s and 
the mother’s interest in not being subjected to this 
behaviour: “This is not good modelling for a child. [Also], 
no parent should be expected to subject himself or herself 
to the bullying of a former spouse in the name of joint 
custody.”157 
 
ii. Parental capacity 
 
The father’s denigration can also be part of a demonstration 
of his poor parental capacity (five cases). The fact that the 
father is violent,158 is a poor role model,159 or puts his desire 
to humiliate the mother above the children’s interest160 
requires granting custody to the mother or reducing the 
father’s access. However, in these cases, the father engaged 
in other problematic behaviours, like physical violence and 
alcohol abuse,161 death threats,162 and repeated criminal 
                                                 
155  DLC v RJM, [2005] OJ No 5500 (QL) at para 46, 2005 CarswellOnt 
8095 (WL Can). 
156  Ibid at para 48. 
157  Ibid. See also BP v UP, [2001] OJ No 378, where the father obtains no 
access (also known as Patel v Patel, 2001 CanLII 38985 (ON CJ)).  
158  Whidden, supra note 143; CC v RW, 2016 ONSC 1274, [2016] OJ No 
909 (QL) [CC]. 
159  Droit de la famille — 16473, 2016 QCCS 908. 
160  Droit de la famille — 082468, 2008 QCCS 4608. 
161  Whidden, supra note 143. 
162  Droit de la famille — 131455, supra note 136. 
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activities.163 The mental-health insults, by themselves, are 
not important enough to make the father a bad parent.  
 
iii. Alienation 
 
In six cases, the name calling is part of a demonstration that 
the father alienates the children from the mother, leading to 
an increase in the mother’s access,164 a change in custody 
favouring the mother,165 or a limitation of the father’s 
access.166 In C.E. v F.E., the father and the children had 
reported the mother’s allegedly strange behaviour to the 
family doctor, who had diagnosed her with a mental illness 
without seeing her and had advised the father to try to have 
her committed.167 The Court finds that the father “quite 
improperly involved the children in his conflict with the 
[mother].”168 The mother chooses to “respect the stated 
views of the children not to have a relationship with her for 
the moment”169 but obtains the right to be present at school 
events. In two other cases, the father’s denigration explains 
why the children reject him and leads to a conclusion that 
the mother does not alienate them from the father.170 
 
                                                 
163  CC, supra note 158. 
164  Droit de la famille — 141720, 2014 QCCS 3341 
165  GB, supra note 154; FDR, supra note 126; EV, supra note 126. 
166  CS, supra note 125. 
167  Ibid at para 15. 
168  CE v FE, [2016] OJ No 3551 (QL) at para 22. 
169  Ibid at para 10. 
170  DN v TE, [2000] OJ No 1189 (QL); Droit de la famille — 073722, 2007 
QCCS 7094. 
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In sum, mental-health insults may advance the 
mother’s case if they are linked to a broader argument 
about the impossibility of shared custody, the father’s 
dangerousness or lack of judgment, or parental alienation. 
By themselves, however, they most often have little 
importance, as judges may reframe them as 
“communication problems” and fail to engage in an 
explicit analysis of sexism, ableism, and emotional 
violence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research has mapped the ways in which gender and 
mental health stigma intersect in custody disputes when 
pop-psychology labels are used in relation to mothers. A 
research based on labels such as “hysterical,” “neurotic,” 
“crazy,” “delusional,” and “emotionally unstable” reveals 
ableist and sexist discourses that are never identified as 
such. Although judges may consider that insulting the 
mother is inappropriate or even violent, a gender-blind 
analysis is the norm. Moreover, fathers, judges and even 
experts use pop-psychology discourses to dramatize 
mothers’ lack of credibility and parenting flaws. Of 
particular concern is the use of inflammatory allegations of 
mental instability by violent fathers. Although fathers’ 
attempts to pathologize mothers are not always successful, 
their unfounded allegations are seldom punished. Out-of-
court assertions that the mother is crazy are not always 
acted on either, as judges often use euphemistic discourses 
to limit the attention that they receive. Still, some judges 
appear more vigilant to opportunistic allegations of mental 
instability and are harsher on fathers who display verbal 
violence by calling the mother “crazy.” All in all, mental-
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health labels often lead to the pathologization of women, 
gender biases, and myths regarding domestic violence. 
 
This article builds on Judith Mosoff’s project to 
expose how the mental-health discourse penalizes mentally 
disabled mothers in custody and child protection 
proceedings, by exploring in turn how the pop-psychology 
discourse that she saw emerging can bring the mental 
health of all mothers into question on the basis of gendered 
interpretations of credibility and parenting abilities. It 
hopes to pay tribute to Judith Mosoff’s work, which 
challenged the legal system and scholars to take gender and 
mental health into account, and to celebrate her spirit by 
continuing to explore and denounce the ways in which our 
assumed neutral system still fails to treat different people 
equally. 
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